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The past six months at the United Nations International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals, the successor organisation of the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (in the following: the Mechanism), have
witnessed an unprecedented series of disqualification motions in both the Mladi#
and Karadži# appeals trials. While the events have been largely claimed to be the
result of an internal power struggle between two senior judges at the Mechanism
and the Prosecution, it is interesting to also take a look at the legal merits of the
arguments brought forward. After a comprehensive overview of the complicated
array of motions and decisions filed, this article will briefly comment on that second
point.
The central underlying provision and legal basis for disqualification requests is
found in Rule 18 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism. In its
substantive parts in paragraph A it reads that ‘A Judge may not sit in any case in
which the Judge has a personal interest or concerning which the Judge has or has
had any association which might affect his impartiality. The Judge shall in any such
circumstance withdraw, and the President shall assign another Judge to the case.’
The spark that started the fire
The original disqualification motions were filed in June 2018 by the Mladi# defence
team.  They contained submissions against the judges Theodor Meron, Carmel
Agius und Liu Daqun. The basic argument of all motions was that explicit findings
of the judges in previous cases on the accused’s role, contribution and knowledge
of certain crimes, as well as his responsibility ‘[gave] rise to an unacceptable
appearance of bias that would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to
apprehend bias in the context of his appeal’.
The motions as such were not a surprise – attempts to disqualify judges had been
made before at the Tribunals, however mostly unsuccessful. This is why Judge
Antonetti’s decision of 3 September 2018 was all the more surprising. He fully
granted the motions of the Defence due to the appearance of bias. All three judges
had made findings in the context of a number of previous decisions concerning the
guilt of the accused for crimes currently contested in his appeal, especially with
regard to questions concerning the chain of command and modes of liability, such as
the ICTY established joint criminal enterprise. According to Judge Antonetti, these
findings constitute sufficient ground for a reasonable observer, properly informed,
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to reasonably apprehend bias.  He also notes that the tribunals took a high risk with
regard to the impartiality of judges, by allowing them to sit in several cases relating
to the same set of factual and legal questions. Antonetti finally points out that the
Mechanism currently has 24 judges at its disposal, which easily makes it possible
to appoint judges, who were uninvolved in any previous decisions concerning facts
related to Mladi# altogether.
The firestorm that followed
It was not long before the Karadži# defence team reacted and went down the same
road as the defence of his former head of military. The original disqualification
motion of 25 September 2018 in essence brought forward the same arguments as
those in Mladi#, directed at Judge Theodor Meron; a second one followed on 12
October 2018 with regard to Judge Sekule. The following developments in this case,
however, unfolded in a far more complex manner.
Judge Meron anticipated a formal reaction of the Chamber by voluntarily withdrawing
from the proceedings on 27 September 2018. He justified this decision with not
wanting to delay the proceedings and harm the interests of the Mechanism any
further, while emphasizing at the same time that he would have kept an impartial
mind nonetheless. The tone gets noticeably harsher when Meron states that ‘the
Mladi# Disqualification Decision clearly contradicts established jurisprudence’ and
(…) harms the interests of the Mechanism by wrongly suggesting that “there is a risk
in terms of appearance where the superior officer […] is being tried, even on appeal
by the judge who found his subordinates guilty”’.
In the following weeks, severalmotions were filed regarding jurisdictional and
administrative matters, more specifically on who was competent to decide on
which qualification motion and the replacement judges in each case. This issue
was particularly relevant in this case due to Meron’s double function as both the
President of the Mechanism and one of the judges involved in the appeals cases.
These procedural aspects are laid down in Rule 18 (B) (i), (ii) and (iv), which state
that the disqualification application is to be made to the President and the decision to
be taken by him or, if the motion concerns him, the most senior judge able to act.
The Prosecution got involved in the substantial disqualification proceedings on 25
October 2018 with a motion brought against Judge Antonetti. The tone certainly
did not get any less harsh. The Prosecution claims that Antonetti has a history
of disregarding precedent to the prejudice of the Prosecution and additionally
has a personal interest in maintaining what they call the ‘Antonetti test’ (the new
disqualification standard developed by him in Mladi#). The motion also brings up
personal animosities between Antonetti and Meron. The Prosecution finally claims
that Antonetti would not even pass the ‘Antonetti test’ himself, as he had ruled on a
disqualification matter concerning Judge Meron before.
Because of the jurisdictional side story to the substantive disqualification matters,
the disqualification motion against Antonetti never got decided on. On 6 November
2018, Judge Meron dismissed the Prosecution’s disqualification motion as moot.
But the jurisdictional disagreement remains – Judge Antonetti issued a separate
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response with ‘observations for the President’, in which he declares the motion as
unfounded. A highly unusual course of action, which marks the provisional end of the
disqualification saga.
What remains once the dust has settled?
The tone of several of the motions suggests that it was presumably personal power
struggles between the two senior judges at the Mechanism and the Prosecution,
which determined the handling of the avalanche of disqualification motions. The fact
that those dominate recent discussions in the last two major cases of the Mechanism
is unpleasant and damages the reputation of the good work the Mechanism and its
precursor Tribunals have accomplished over many years. However, now that the
dust is starting to settle, a closer look at the actual legal question at hand and the
facts and problems behind the disqualification saga is pertinent. It shows that the
situation at the ICTY and ICTR as well as the Mechanism is a unique one in this
regard and might be more complex than it seems at first glance.
There are several reasons for that. Firstly, the ad-hoc character of the tribunals,
which limited them to deal with ‘only’ one particular conflict from the outset.
Secondly, the fact that the Prosecution followed a so-called pyramidical prosecutorial
strategy, bringing cases against perpetrators located relatively low in the hierarchy
first (as for example in the first judgement of the ICTY, Tadi#), to be able to build a
case against the more senior people responsible, such as Mladi# and Karadži#, later
on. Thirdly, the Tribunals are – inter alia – known for the establishment of extremely
wide modes of liability, e.g. the (controversial) joint criminal enterprise.
All of these factors taken together have the effect that cases before the Tribunals
and the Mechanism are far more intertwined than those before the International
Criminal Court for example. Certain facts and legal questions are bound to reappear
in a number of cases. Judges were and are involved in a number of cases that
deal with the same set of facts and legal questions, and therefore, even if only
indirectly, deal with the question of the guilt of the accused in other, subsequent
cases. The question if these multiple involvements are desirable and compatible with
the relevant legal provisions is not an illegitimate one per se. Especially when one
keeps in mind that actual bias is not even necessary for a disqualification – the mere
appearance of such is sufficient. The organisational structure of the Mechanism
allows for the assignment of previously altogether uninvolved judges, so why not
make use of it? The above-mentioned unique mandate, structure and legal novelties
of the Tribunals and the Mechanism have enabled them to work efficiently and
successfully through hundreds of cases. With regard to the challenge of preventing
even the slightest doubt as to the impartiality of judges, these features might be
curse and blessing at the same time.
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